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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
)
Plaintiff and Appellant, (
Case No.

vs.

)

9258

SHERRILL Z. CHESNUT,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On the 5th day of February, 1960, the District Court
in and for the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Utah,
County of Sevier, denied the motion of the State of Utah
for an order to show cause as to the defendant, Sherrill Z.
Chesnut, respondent herein, said motion having been filed
by the District Attorney for the Sixth Judicial District.
This brief submitted herein is in support of an appeal by
the Attorney General of the State of Utah from such order
of the District Court in and for the Sixth Judicial District,
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and is taken under and pursuant to Section 77-39-4, U. C. A.
1953, which states in part:
''An appeal may be taken by the state:
"* * *
"(3) From an order made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the state. * * *"
As a condition precedent to a discussion and development of the substantive law surrounding this appeal, it is,
of course, a necessity to set forth the facts which serve as
a basis for such discussion.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pursuant to a commitment, an information was filed
on the 12th day of November, 1959, by the District Attorney
for Sevier County, charging the respondent herein with the
commission of acts against the State of Utah, to wit: Second Degree Burglary and Grand Larceny. The respondent,
on the 7th day of December, 1959, after a continuance from
December 3, 1959, plead "not guilty" to both counts and
the case was set down for trial. On the 5th day of January,
1960, the respondent appeared before the court, withdrew
his plea of "not guilty," and substituted in place thereof
the plea of "guilty to both counts" (R. 21 & 22). Having
been advised by Chesnut that he would waive the time required by statute (see 77-35-1, U. C. A. 1953) for the pronouncement of judgment, the court entered judgment and
sentenced the respondent in the Prison of the State of Utah
for a term of not less than one year nor more than 20 years
on the count of second degree burglary, and for a term of
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not less than one year nor more than 10 years for the crime
of grand larceny, said sentences to run concurrently.
The court thereupon suspended execution of the sentence in accordance with 77-35-17, U. C. A. 1953, and placed
the respondent on probation. In doing so the court stated:
"The Court, however, in this case, suspends
execution of sentence for a period at this time of
sixty days until March 14, 1960, at the hour of 2 :00
o'clock p. m. This suspension is on condition that
you remain under the custody and supervision of
your bondsman, Mr. McCarthy, and that except with
his consent, I will say, that you remain outside of
Sevier County, except with Mr. McCarthy's consent
or in case you are summoned to appear here at any
time in court and you will be required to appear,
however, on March 14th and for such further action
as the court might see fit to take.
"I will say frankly, this is a chance to make
good without having to serve time in State Prison
and if you make good on this, why there will be further extensions until you will have an opportunity
to clear yourself of the matter, but that will depend
on you entirely, of course. Vv-re want to give you
this opportunity rather than to require you to serve,
except if it becomes imperative, I will say. We see
no other reasonable way, so we feel that everybody
involved in this is doing it for what we feel is your
best interest and that you will be duly appreciative
of it and make every effort to make entirely good.
Not only with us, but with your bondsman and
everybody concerned, so at this time you are released to your bondsman and the bond will remain
in force as it now is" (R. 22-23).
Subsequently, on or about the 4th day of February, 1960,
the District Attorney for Sevier County filed with the court
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a motion for an order to show cause why the suspension
of the execution of sentence should not be terminated and
incarceration follow forthwith. Attached to said motion
were affidavits of two peace officers of the Salt Lake City
Police Department, the general context of the affidavits
being that this respondent had admitted to each of them
his direct implication in a burglary in Salt Lake City on or
about January 26, 1960. The District Court, after a consideration of the motion for the order to show cause and
the affidavits upon which such motion was predicated,
denied the District Attorney's request on the bases that:
That the attempted probation arrangen1ent entered into in connection with said Stay of
Execution was not within the perview of the Statutes; that the implied obligations therof could not
be legally fulfilled by the Court.
" ( 2) That even assuming said attempted probation arrangement to be generally valid, the terms
and conditions thereof as disclosed by the record
are so lacking and so indefinite and uncertain as to
be unenforcible" (R. 17).
" ( 1)

The court then ordered that the stay of execution be extended and continued until June 14, 1960, or until such
time as the court may determine. This appeal is taken and
directed to that order of the court denying the issuance of
the order to show cause.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT, IN PLACING THE
RESPONDENT UNDER THE CUSTODY AND
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SUPERVISION OF HIS BONDSMAN, DID NOT
POSITION THE RESPONDE,NT WITHOUT
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT, AND IT
HAD, THEREFORE, FULL AUT'HORITY TO
ENTERTAIN AND ISSUE AN ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE, TO TERlVIINATE PROBATION
THEREAFTER AND COMMIT THE PROBATIONER.
POINT II.
EVEN WERE IT ASSUMED THAT THE ORDER SUSPENDING EXECUTION OF SENTENCE WAS INVALID, VOID OR UNCERTAIN, SUCH ORDER DOES NOT AFFECT THE
FINALITY OR VALIDITY OF THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE PREVIOUSLY ENTERED BY THE COURT.
POINT III.
THE ORDER DENYING THE STATE'S MOTlOX FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE IS
TANTAMOUNT TO A PARDON, T'HE RESULT
OF WHICH LIES WITHOUT THE PROVINCE,
POvVER OR AUTHORITY OF THE JUDICIARY.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT, IN PLACING THE
RESPONDENT UNDER THE CUSTODY AND
SUPERVISION OF HIS BONDSMAN, DID NOT
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POSITION THE RESPO·NDENT WITHOUT
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT, AND IT
HAD, THEREFORE, FULL AUTHORITY TO
ENTERTAIN AND ISSUE AN ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE, TO TERMINATE PROBATION
THEREAFTER AND COMMIT THE PROBATIONER.
The first statement that should be made, and one
which is subject to little· debate, is that the intention of the
District Court in suspending execution of sentence was to
place Chesnut on probation. The pronouncement of the
court is in every way consistent and in accord with the
normal and usual address wherein the convicted defendant
is placed on conditional probation. The language of the
court is in harmony with no other observation:
"THE COURT: I will say frankly, this is a
chance to make good without having to serve time in
State Prison and if you make good on this, why
there will be further extensions until you will have
an opportunity to clear yourself of the matter, but
that vvill depend on you entirely, of course. We want
to give you this opportunity rather than to require
you to serve, * * *

* * *

"lVIR. CHAlVI:BERLAIN: Your Honor, I would
like the record to show that he is under the strict
supervision and control of his bondsmen with respect to whatever"* * *
"THE COURT: "'rith respect to what he does
and his course of conduct. That is what I really
intended-under the control and supervision.
"* * *
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"THE COURT: But if the thing is justified,
we will make the extensions longer. It depends entirely on, I would say, your course of conduct, which
we hope will be in every way satisfactory" ( R. 2324).
To profess that the intent of the District Court and the
effect of the afore-quoted language was otherwise than to
place Chesnut on probation is to admit that the respondent
is subject to immediate commitment to the State Prison.
There is no basis to contradict the principle that a dis,trict
court, in suspending sentence or execution of sentence, must
proceed under and pursuant to the statutory legislation of
the State of Utah.
Justice Hansen, writing for this Court in the case of
State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 Pac. 1044, 1027, stated
that the district courts of this state have no power to suspend indefinitely execution of sentence. The cases. in the
State of California are also parallel in effect to that in
Utah, in holding that the authority of a court to suspend
the execution of sentence is dependent wholly upon statutory authorization, People v. Brown, 244 P. 2d 702 (Cal.
App. 1952), that a court has no power to suspend execution
other than by granting probation, and that an attempt
of the court to do otherwise is void. People v. Cravens, 251
P. 2d 717 (Cal. App. 1953). See also In Re Clark, 70 Cal.
App. 643, 234 Pac. 109.
The statutes of this state evidence no other conclusion.
77-35-17, U. C. A. 1953, provides in part:
"Upon a plea. of guilty or conviction of any
crime or offense, if it appears compatible with the
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public interest, the court having jurisdiction may
suspend the imposition or the execution of sentence
and may place the defendant on probation for such
period of time as the court shall determine.
"The court may subsequently increase or decrease the probation period, and may revoke or
modify any condition of probation. * * *" (Emphasis added.)
Once the court determines that it is in the public interest
to suspend the execution of sentence, probation and probationary status follow a fortiori. This interpretation is
cemented by the Z olantakis decision in holding that:
"Trial courts are not given authority to sus.pend
sentences as a matter of favor or grace, but only
when 'it appears compatible with the public interest'."
In this connection it is well to consider the recent holding
of Baine v. Beckstead, ... Utah ... , 347 P. 2d 555 (1959),
wherein it was declared:
"It is to be kept in mind that deferments of
commitment of persons convicted of crime are of
two distinct types: One is probationary, the other
is not."
It would be a mistake not to say that the District Court
intended, as its object in postponing conm1itment under the
judgment pronounced in the case at bar, to place the respondent on the level of probation with the objective of
achieving son1e measure of rehabilitation.
The order of the District Court denying the State's
motion for an order to show cause as to this respondent
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indicates that the District Court felt that it no longer had
jurisdiction to entertain further proceedings relative to the
probationary status of respondent or subsequent commitment thereunder. After the hearing of January 5, 1960,
wherein the probationary status was fulfilled, the District
Court retained and still retains the legal custody of the
respondent. 77-62-29 sets forth that:
"The legal custody of all probationers is vested
in the chief agent and the court having jurisdiction
of the offender."
The fact that Chesnut was placed under the custody and
supervision of his bondsman, Mr. McCarthy, is of no
moment in considering the primary question of the District Court's jurisdiction to proceed in the case.
By all odds, the proceedings before the court on January 5, 1960 resulted in Chesnut being placed on probation,
ho\vever uncertain the terms of probation may have been.
This \Vas the understanding of the court; it was the understanding of the District Attorney; it was the understanding
of the bondsman, 1.\ir. McCarthy, and it was the understanding of the respondent. Subsequently, it was disclosed to the
District Attorney by officers of the Salt Lake City Police
Department that Chesnut was seriously implicated in the
burglary of a business establishment in Salt Lake City ( R.
13, 14, 15, 16) on January 26, 1960, barely 21 days, after
the hearing before the District Court. Such information
constituted the basis for the motion, upon behalf of the
State, for an order to show cause why probation should
not be revoked and commitment issue. Said motion, taken
together with the accompanying affidavits, is entirely in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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accord 'vith the procedural steps outlined by this Court as
a requisite to due process of law:
"A defendant out of prison on probation is accorded due process of law by the following steps, all
of which were followed in this case: ( 1) The filing
of a verified statement or an affidavit in the case
setting forth facts which show a violation of the
terms of probation. ( 2) The issuance of an order
to show cause and citation thereon requiring the
defendant to appear and show cause why probation
should not be revoked, apprising defendant of the
ground or grounds on which revocation is sought,
and specifying a proper time for hearing. (3) A
hearing before the court on the question of violation of some term or condition of probation, at
which the defendant has the opportunity to crossexamine witnesses against him and also to present
evidence to refute the claimed violation of the condition of probation. ( 4) A determination of the
question, followed by entry of an appropriate order.
State v. Zolantakis, supra." (State v. Bonza, 106
Utah 553, 150 P. 2d 970, (1944).
The failure, therefore, of the District Court to grant and
forthwith issue the order to show cause injures and seriously restricts the effective administration of the criminal
law in this state, and amounts to reversible error subject to
review by this Court.

POINT II.
EVEN WERE IT ASSUMED THAT THE ORDER SUSPENDING EXECUTION OF SENTENCE WAS INVALID, VOID OR UNCERTAIN, SUCH ORDER DOES NOT AFFECT THE
FINALITY OR VALIDITY OF THE JUDGSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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MENT AND SENTENCE· PREVIOUSLY ENTERED BY THE COURT.
The order of the District Court in its deferment or stay
of execution under the judgment, as announced, required
the respondent to remain within the control and supervision
of Jack McCarthy, his bondsman. Even were it to be assumed that this segment of the order was ineffective or
void as being inconsistent and against the provisions of
77-62-29, U. C. A. 1953, such has no effect upon the validity
and enforcibility of the valid and enforcible portion of the
judgment. As to the latter, the judgment and sentence may
be carried into effect and further proceedings may be had
relative to the station of the respondent. Reese v. Olsen, 44
Utah 318, 139 Pac. 941. The Supreme Court of Idaho, in
passing upon a case of similar identity, stated:

"* * *

By the great weight of authority
where the court makes an unauthorized order suspending the execution of the sentence imposed by
the judgment, such order does not prevent the subsequent enforcement of the valid portion of the sentence at a later date." (Ex Parte Jennings, 267 Pac.
227 (Idaho 1928) .

"'

The basis for this holding is, of course, that the invalid
suspension of the execution of sentence in no way affects
the finality and validity of the judgment of the court, which,
in this case, imprisoned Chesnut in the State Prison of
Utah for a term of not less than one nor more than 20 years
for the crime of second degree burglary, and: for the term
of not less than one nor more than 10 years for the crime
of grand larceny, such sentences to be concurrent.
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The Supreme Court of Colorado, by decision, is also
devoted to the proposition that the judgment and sentence
may be executed subsequently notwithstanding a previous
invalid effort to suspend execution of sentence. In Re
Nottingham, 268 Pac. 587 (Colo. 1928). Citing 16 C. J., p.
1335, the Colorado Court said :
"The invalidity of the attempt to suspend execution of the sentence does not affect the validity
of the sentence of imprisonment; that sentence may
be enforced even after the expiration of the court
term, and even after the expiration of six months
from the date of sentence, which was the time of
imprisonment specified in the sentence."
The majority rule is also stated as above in 24 C. J. S., Sec.
1618b(10) (b).
The District Court is therefore within its province, if
probation be void or ineffective, to issue a commitment
forthwith, for the judgment of the District Court can only
be fulfilled judicially by satisfying its requirements. Ex
Parte Jennings, supra.

POINT III.
THE ORDER DENYING THE STATE'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE IS
TANTAMOUNT TO A PARDON, THE RESULT
OF vVHICH LIES WITHOUT THE PROVINCE,
POvVER OR AUTHORITY OF THE JUDICIARY.
If the view entertained by the District Court herein
be accurate with respect to Chesnut in its denial of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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State's motion for an order to show cause, and if the court
fails or refuses to exercise its continuing jurisdiction over
the respondent, the final product would be to award to
the latter a pardon of not one, but of both offenses to
which he had formerly plead guilty. The rule is so well
established in this state that the pardoning power is the
exclusive function of the Board of Pardons, that it is only
for the purpose of the record that authorities be listed.
Ca.rdisco v. Davis, et al., 91 Utah 323, 64 P. 2d 216; State
ex rel. Bishop v. State Board of Corrections·, 16 Utah 478,
52 Pac. 1090; Utah Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 12. As a
necessary corollary to this principle, State v. Blackburn, 6
Utah 347, 23 P. 759, holds that the authority to relieve
a party from the conviction of a crime does not reside with
the judiciary.
The status of probation which Chesnut has attained
is not a game of "hide and seek" played by and between the
State of Utah and the probationer. The underlying theory
of probation is rehabilitation and establishment as a lawabiding citizen and is so proclaimed in the Baine and Z olantakis cases, supra. In the event that the probationer proves
unfaithful to his trust and the obligations to the court and
society, it becomes the duty of the District Court to inquire
into such unfaithfulness; it would only meet the test of substantial justice and serve the legitimate enforcement of
the criminal law in this state for the order of the District
Court denying the State's motion to be reversed and the
case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings
under a show cause order.

,,

I'
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CONCLUSION
The deferment of execution of sentence as to Sherrill
Chesnut under proceedings had in open court on January
5, 1960, effectually placed the latter on probation subject
to the continuing jurisdiction of the District Court to review, modify or revoke such probation on proper showing.
Upon application and motion of the District Attorney for
an order to show cause why further stays should not be
granted and commitment issue, coupled with the affidavits
of the officers of the Salt Lake City Police Department, the
District Court should issue a show cause order as to the
probationer and inquire into the faithfulness of his conduct.
If this Court shall determine that the suspended execution of sentence was void, ineffective, or so uncertain as
to be unenforcible, then the District Court should be directed to order that the respondent be committed to the
State Prison, State of Utah, pursuant to and in accordance
with the judgment and sentence of the District Court.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General,
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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